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 INTRODUCTION 
The district court’s determination that A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3) is facially 
overbroad (ER1at 20) depends upon its premise that students have “an established 
right to receive information and ideas in the classroom” (ER1 at 15).  This Court 
should reverse the district court’s decision that section 15-112(A)(3) is facially 
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment because the district court’s premise 
and its conclusion are both incorrect.  The contours of a student’s First 
Amendment right to receive information are uncertain, ill-defined, and—most 
importantly—subject to the State’s broad and plenary authority over curricular 
matters.  Moreover, any right that a student has to receive information is not 
implicated by this subsection of the statute, which does not prohibit all ethnic 
studies classes, but only prohibits those that are “designed primarily for pupils of a 
particular ethnic group.” A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3).  Subsection 15-112(A)(3) is not 
overbroad either.  When read in connection with the statute’s remaining provisions, 
including the Declaration of Policy, it complements those provisions by assuring 
that the State’s goal of reducing racism in schools is met by preventing districts 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-112(A)(3) Does Not Implicate Any First 
Amendment Right of a Student to Receive Information. 
The district court relied on Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861 
(1982) and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) as 
support for its premise “that limits on curriculum should be upheld as long as they 
reasonably relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” (ER1 at 16.)  Neither, in 
fact, addresses limits on the State’s power to set curriculum, and neither is 
sufficient support for that proposition.  Pico addressed the removal of books from a 
school library.   And while it began with a reminder that the Supreme Court’s 
“precedents have long recognized certain constitutional limits upon the power of 
the State to control even the curriculum and classroom,” 457 U.S. at 861, it also 
emphasized that “the current action does not require us to re-enter this difficult 
terrain,” and that “[r]espondents do not seek  . . . to impose limitations on their 
school Board’s discretion to prescribe the curricula” (id., at 862).   It further 
emphasized that “public education in our Nation is committed to the control of 
state and local authorities” and that “there is a legitimate and substantial 
community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be 
they social, moral, or political.” Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
While the district court paid lip service to these principles and even recognized that 
any curricular restrictions would be subject to only limited scrutiny, it in fact failed 
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to accord sufficient respect to state and local authorities’ ability to “defend [their] 
claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum.”1 (ER1 at 11-12, 15) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
The Arce Plaintiffs failed to address Hazelwood in their Response and 
Reply, perhaps because this decision, although relied upon by the district court, 
does not address a student’s right to receive information.  Rather, it involves school 
officials’ control of student speech in a school-sponsored newspaper, allowing 
such control as long as it is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.  Importantly, the Hazelwood Court stated 
further that “[i]t is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored . . . vehicle 
of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is 
so directly and sharply implicate[d] as to require judicial intervention to protect 
students’ constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   Here, of course, the State is not censoring student expression; it is 
instead carrying out its constitutionally mandated responsibility to educate 
Arizona’s youth. 
The district court also cites Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983), 
and Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998), 
                                           
1 As the State pointed out in Appellees’ Principal and Response Brief, not only 
does it possess substantial authority over curriculum, but Arizona’s Constitution 
obligates it to educate the state’s youth. (Doc. 44 at 23-24)  
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to support its conclusion regarding a student’s purported First Amendment right to 
receive information.  Neither justifies that conclusion.  Johnson assumed without 
analysis that a student has a right to receive information.  702 F.2d at 195.  
Monteiro involved a parent’s effort to have Huck Finn removed from the 
classroom based on the on the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause; 
the Ninth Circuit wisely rejected that effort because other students’ “First 
Amendment rights are infringed when books that have been determined by the 
school district to have legitimate educational value are removed from a mandatory 
reading list because of threats of damages, lawsuits, or other forms of retaliation.” 
158 F.3d  at 1029.   
While as the district court noted, Monteiro does rely on Pico in recognizing 
that students have some kind of First Amendment right to receive information, id. 
at 1027 n.5, it also notes that such a claim would “significantly interfere with the 
District’s discretion to determine the composition of its curriculum.”  Id. at 1029.  
Here, the State stands in a stronger position than did the school district in 
Monteiro, because it is constitutionally obligated to educate its youth.  See supra, 
n.1.  Thus, this Court should, as it did in Monteiro, respect the educational 
determination that the State has made.  Id. (deferring to school board’s 
determination regarding students’ education). 
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The Arce Plaintiffs commit the same error as the district court and 
compound it by erecting straw men, suggesting that the State is somehow arguing 
that its plenary authority over curriculum would allow it to remove materials from 
schools for any reason or even for a bad reason.  (Doc. 52 at 34.)  They give too 
little weight to the State’s acknowledgement that the Constitution plays a role in 
limiting a State’s discretion over curriculum (Doc. 44 at 25) while at the same time 
insisting that the State removed material from Tucson Unified School District’s 
classrooms and that it seeks to justify its right to do so here and in the future.  But, 
as the State made clear both below and in its Principal and Response Brief, the 
Arce Plaintiffs’ argument that the State removed books from TUSD or required 
elimination of the Mexican American Studies program is entirely unsupported by 
any evidence.  (Doc. 44 at 21-22.)  Instead of pointing to evidence that 
demonstrates that the State removed books or eliminated the program, the Arce 
Plaintiffs recycle their tired and misleading argument that the State’s actions 
“caused” the removal of books or had the effect of removing the program.  (Doc. 
52 at 32-33.)  The Arce Plaintiffs’ failure to controvert the State’s evidence that 
TUSD, a nonparty, removed the books and shut down the program is a tacit 
concession as to the truth of the State’s position. 
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II. Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-112(A)(3) Is Not Overbroad.  
The Arce Plaintiffs and the district court’s conclusion that A.R.S. § 15-
112(A)(3) is overbroad suffers from the same deficiency as does their analysis of a 
student’s right to receive information.  In neither analysis do they sufficiently 
credit the State’s responsibility and obligation over public school curricula.  
Subsection 15-112(A)(3) represents the State’s legitimate concern that courses and 
classes not be designed  to promote the balkanization of schools.  The desire to 
ensure that curricula does not promote segregation of ethnic groups is a separate, 
complementary purpose that helps carry out the statute’s stated goal of ensuring 
that “public school pupils [are] taught to treat and value each other as individuals.” 
A.R.S. § 15-111.  As such, it is a legitimate exercise of the State’s plenary 
authority over curriculum, and the district court should not have struck it down. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the district court’s 
decision striking down subsection A.R.S. § 15-112 (A)(3). 
 Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 2014. 
 
 




s/Leslie Kyman Cooper 
Leslie Kyman Cooper 
Jinju Park  




Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and the Arizona State Board of  
Education 
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